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Comments
REGULATION FD PROVIDES FIRM FOOTING ON
SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE HIGH WIRE
I. INTRODUCTION
Investment analysts perform an essential function in the securities
markets by collecting, verifying and evaluating information disclosed by
securities issuers.1 Analysts collect information from a number of sources,
including public securities filings, press releases and direct contact with
issuer personnel.2 Analysts are frequently employed to provide investment
advice either exclusively or, more frequently, by investment management
firms.3 In either case, the analyst's role is to discover information and
make investment recommendations based upon the information re-
vealed.4 In return for compensation, these recommendations are commu-
nicated to a small number of investors, who reap the information's
potential benefits. 5 In addition, multi-service investment firms regularly
use the information when investing for their own accounts.6
Frequently, in the course of collecting and verifying investment infor-
mation, analysts receive material nonpublic information from corporate
insiders such as directors and officers. The disclosure may be in response
to specific questions asked or may be encompassed in an official statement
made to a select group of individuals. 7 This kind of corporate communi-
cation is referred to as "selective disclosure" and is a practice the Securities
1. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (recognizing important role that
securities analysts play in investment community); Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule
lOb-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
1517, 1519-20 (1992) (same).
2. See Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider
Trading, 76 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1990) (discussing process of analysis).
3. See id. (describing various arrangements to provide investment advice).
4. See id. at 1025-26 (defining investment analyst) (citing HousE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95T- CONG., REPORT OF THE ADvISORY COMM.
ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC 89 (1977)).
5. See id. at 1026 (stating group must be "small enough lest the potential trad-
ing advantage to each be lost").
6. See id. ("[I]ntuition suggests that information generated by such ... firms
will first find its way to the firm's own trading desks and its institutional clients, and
only be filtered along to retail customers after most of the opportunity for an infor-
mational trading advantage has disappeared.").
7. See id. ("[Qjuestions may be raised in group meetings with analysts... or in
face-to-face or telephone contacts between a single analyst and a company insider.
The opportunity for some sort of tipping occurs in the latter setting.").
(645)
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and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") has condemned. 8
The SEC adopted a scheme of regulations, known as Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure), to specifically address selective disclosure, regarding the prac-
tice as abusive because of the unfair advantage bestowed upon traders
privy to the selectively disclosed information, and viewing its occurrence as
frequent.9
This Comment is tailored to Regulation FD, its possible effects upon
the capital markets and the relationship between issuers and analysts. Part
II sets forth the judicial background regarding selective disclosure prior to
Regulation FD. 10 Next, Part III examines Regulation FD and its man-
dates."I Finally, Part IV argues that Regulation FD may increase overall
market efficiency and promote fairness in the marketplace. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193413 ("Exchange Act")
prohibits trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. 14 Infor-
mation "is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
8. For a discussion of the SEC's position regarding selective disclosure, see
infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
9. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592
n.15 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249) (citing
Richard Frankel, Marilyn Johnson & Douglas J. Skinner, An Empirical Examination
of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium, 37J. Accr. RES. 133 (1999) (find-
ing trading volume, average trade size and stock price volatility all increased imme-
diately after communications between issuers and analysts)); Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,717 n.ll (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (listing cases of possible selective disclosure
reported in media); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,716 ("Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that ad-
dresses selective disclosure."); NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATIONS INSTITUTE, A STUDY
OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES, SECOND MEASUREMENT 18 (1998) (reporting
that 26% of responding companies admitted to selectively disclosing information).
10. For a discussion of the judicial background behind selective disclosure,
see infra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
11. For an examination of Regulation FD, see infra notes 57-95 and accompa-
nying text.
12. For analysis of Regulation FD's possible effects, see infra notes 96-164 and
accompanying text.
13. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (2000).
14. See id. Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
[Vol. 46: p. 645
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shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."15 For
information to be material, "there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the [information] would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."' 6 Information is nonpublic if it has not been disseminated in a
manner making it generally available to the public.
17
Although Rule 10b-5 seems to prohibit trading based on any material
nonpublic information, Congress, the United States Supreme Court and
the SEC recognize the necessary role that securities analysts play in the
investment community.18 Consequently, the question has repeatedly sur-
faced as to what extent corporate insiders and those to whom they selec-
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
15. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (setting forth
standard of materiality in proxy solicitation context).
16. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., 426
U.S. at 449). The Basic Court adopted the TSC Industries standard of materiality for
purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. at 232 (adopting standard). The
materiality of information regarding contingent or speculative events depends
upon the court balancing the probability that the event will occur and the magni-
tude of the event. See id. (discussing balancing); see also General Rules and Regula-
tions, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2000) (defining material for
purposes of Securities Act of 1933 and registration forms thereunder); General
Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2
(2000) (defining material for purposes of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
17. SeeBehrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 544 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(finding sporadic reports from Canadian affiliates to New York investment firms
insufficient to make information public (citing In Re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 643 (1971)); SECv. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc)).
18. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 n.16 (1980) (noting
Congress' recognition that market professionals "contribute to a fair and orderly
marketplace at the same time they exploit the informational advantage that comes
from their possession of [nonpublic information]."). In Dirks v. SEC, the Court
stated:
[I] nformation that the analysts obtain [by meeting with and questioning
corporate officers and others who are insiders] normally may be the basis
for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities. The
analyst's judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or
otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of informa-
tion, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information cannot
be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the
public generally.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (emphasis added).
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Dirks, the SEC conceded that "'[t]he
value to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market effi-
ciency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and
analyze information, and thus the analyst's work rebounds to the benefit of all
investors."' See id. at 658 n.17 (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1406). But see
Chairman Arthur Levitt, Address at the Economic Club of New York City (Oct. 18,
1999), at http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/levitt101999.cfm (discussing
role of analysts in capital marketplace). Chairman Levitt stated:
2001] COMMENT 647
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tively disclose material nonpublic information can be held liable for
insider trading under the federal securities laws.
B. Rule 1 Ob-5 Liability and the Supreme Court's Ruling in Dirks v. SEC
When faced with the question of imposing insider trading liability in
the context of selective disclosure, the United States Supreme Court in
Dirks v. SEC19 found that "[i]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely
because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from
an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role
of market analysts .... ,,20 The Court went on to state that in order to
establish lOb-5 liability in the context of selective disclosure, the SEC must
prove: (1) the corporate insider breached a fiduciary duty to the company
by making the disclosure; (2) the corporate insider received some direct
or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure; and (3) the recipient of
the information breached a duty to the corporation's shareholders by
trading on the basis of the information received.2 ' Again, however, the
Court stressed that "[a] 11 disclosures of confidential corporate information
are not inconsistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders."22
The first two elements of the Dirks test, which address the liability of a
corporate insider, are seemingly related because whether or not a disclo-
sure constitutes a breach of duty depends on the disclosure's purpose.23
An insider's disclosure is improper when corporate information, intended
to be used only for corporate purposes, is used for the insider's personal
advantage. 24 " [T] he test is whether the insider personally will benefit, di-
rectly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there
Don't misunderstand me, analysts serve an important role in ensuring the
efficiency of our markets .... In a market that increasingly demands that
all participants add value to compete, analysts have positioned themselves
well to do so. But if analysts continue to view the world through rose-
colored lenses, they doom themselves to irrelevance.
Id.
19. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
20. Id. at 658.
21. See id. at 661-64 (listing elements of offense). The third element applies
only to recipients of information, and consequently is not necessary to establish a
corporate insider's liability. See id. For a discussion of the two ways that a corpo-
rate outsider may acquire a duty to the corporation's shareholders, see infra notes
30-35 and accompanying text.
22. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-62. For instance, a corporate insider or a recipient
analyst may not know whether the information is material, or may mistakenly think
that the information has already been disclosed to the market. See id. at 662 (stat-
ing "[i]n some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to
shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market").
23. See id. at 662 ("Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends
in large part on the purpose of the disclosure.").
24. See id. at 663 (rejecting SEC's argument that having to establish improper
purpose would impede enforcement because "it would be a rare situation when
the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for
transmitting the information").
[Vol. 46: p. 645
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has been no breach of duty to [the] stockholders."2 5 This test requires
courts to focus on objective criteria, such as whether the insider received a
"pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings."26 Nevertheless, the Dirks Court noted that certain relationships
can create an inference of improper purpose.
27
Next, consider the possible liability of the information's recipient.
28
In order to violate Rule 10b-5, an analyst or another securities professional
must owe a duty to the corporation's shareholders. 29 Under Dirks, there
are two ways that a duty to disclose or abstain from trading can be imposed
upon an individual receiving material nonpublic information: (1) the re-
cipient trades on information known to have been provided in breach of a
duty or (2) the recipient's confidential relationship with the company im-
poses upon the individual a duty that is breached by the subsequent
25. Id. at 662. "The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend." Id. at 664.
26. Id. at 663. The SEC has focused on the "reputational benefit" language in
Dirks to allege 10b-5 violations in the context of selective disclosures. See, e.g.,
Plaintiff's Complaint, SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC
LEXIS 451 (Mar. 19, 1991) (91 Civ. 1869). For a discussion of the Stevens com-
plaint, see infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
27. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (observing "there may be a relationship between
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter").
28. This discussion will be limited to analysts' liability under Dirks alone.
Note, however, that in the context of a tender offer, analyst liability can be estab-
lished under Rule 14-e as well. During a tender offer, there are a fairly large num-
ber of people who receive confidential nonpublic information but owe no duty to
the issuer's shareholders and may consequently be tempted to engage in insider
trading. See SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing cir-
cumstances of tender offers). Furthermore, while the SEC may be able to circum-
stantially prove the individual was knowingly trading on inside information, it
would be exceedingly difficult to prove the outsider obtained the information in
breach of a fiduciary duty. See id. (noting same). Consequently, "Congress gave
the SEC broad ... power to 'define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."'
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000)).
Exercising this granted authority, the SEC adopted Rule 14-e. An individual
violates Rule 14-e if the individual trades on the basis of material nonpublic infor-
mation concerning a tender offer that he or she knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or
someone working on their behalf. See id. (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)
(2000)). Rule 14-e eases the SEC's evidentiary burden by eliminating the need to
prove a breach of fiduciary duty. See id. (same). "The 'breach of a duty' analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks under Rule lOb-5 does not
apply to Rule 14e-3." SEC v. Wang, Litigation Release No. 11780, 1988 SEC LEXIS
1364, at *58 (June 27, 1988). Consequently, in the context of a tender offer, ana-
lysts and other market professionals could violate Rule 14-e even though their ac-
tions would not subject them to liability under Dirks.
29. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564-66 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (discussing Dirks and Chiarella, stating "a fiduciary duty does not run ...
solely as a result of one's possession of material nonpublic information"); see also
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 (declining to decide whether Dirks acquired fiduciary duty to
corporation's shareholders by virtue of his position as employee of broker-dealer).
5
Horgan: Regulation FD Provides Firm Footing on Selective Disclosure High
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46: p. 645
trade.30 First, an analyst could violate Rule 10b-5 if the analyst trades on
material nonpublic information that the analyst knows or has reason to
know is supplied in breach of the corporate insider's duty to the corpora-
tion.31 As the Court in Dirks explained:
[T]he tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that
of the insider's duty ....
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. 32
Second, the confidential nature of the recipient's relationship with
the company may transform the recipient into a "temporary insider,"
thereby imposing a duty to disclose or abstain from trading upon the re-
cipient.3 3 A fiduciary duty, however, cannot be unilaterally imposed sim-
ply by entrusting a person with confidential information.3 4 Objective
30. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, 660 (explaining facts creating duty to disclose or
abstain).
31. See id. at 659-60 (setting forth rule).
32. Id. The Dirks "knowledge of breach" requirement has been construed to
require: (1) knowledge of the tipper's breach and (2) knowledge of the personal
benefit. See, e.g., State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. 592, 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("It is recognized that this reading of Dirks permits the possibility
... that an improperly motivated tipper may pass information to a tippee who lacks
knowledge of the tipper's personal benefit and who may therefore trade on inside
information without liability."). Regulation FD obviates the requirement that the
SEC show any personal benefit or knowledge thereof. See General Rule Regarding
Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000) (stating general rule).
33. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 (discussing circumstances creating "temporary
insider"). In a frequently cited footnote, the Court in Dirks acknowledged that
under certain circumstances outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders:
"[W]here corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, ac-
countant, lawyer, or consultant... [t]he basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
... that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corpo-
rate purposes." Id. at 655 n.14. For examples of cases citing footnote fourteen of
Dirks, see SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1439-40 (C.D. Cal. 1988); United
States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1986); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
34. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding duty cannot be created unilaterally). Walton concerned the actions of an
investment bank, Morgan Stanley. See id. at 797-98 (stating facts). While investigat-
ing possible takeover targets for one of its clients, Morgan Stanley obtained unpub-
lished material information (internal earnings reports) on a confidential basis
from a prospective target, Olinkraft. See id. at 797. After its client abandoned the
planned takeover, Morgan Stanley used the information to trade Olinkraft stock.
See id. In rejecting the argument that Morgan Stanley owed a duty to the Olinkraft
shareholders, the court noted, "Put bluntly, although ... Olinkraft's management
placed its confidence in Morgan Stanley not to disclose the information, Morgan
Stanley owed no duty to observe that confidence." Id. at 799.
650
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factors indicating a confidential relationship must be present to create the
outsider's duty.
35
The facts of Dirks illustrate the Court's analysis. Raymond Dirks was a
securities analyst who received information from a former officer of Equity
Funding of America about serious financial irregularities at the company,
which resulted in materially overstated earnings. 36 Dirks investigated the
allegations, and certain Equity Funding employees corroborated the alle-
gations of fraud.37 Dirks then discussed the information with various cli-
ents and investors, some of whom were able to avoid substantial losses by
liquidating their interests in the company.38 In finding that Dirks had not
aided and abetted a violation of the laws against insider trading, the Court
stated:
It is clear that neither [the former Equity Funding officer] nor
the other Equity Funding employees violated their ... duty to the
corporation's shareholders by providing information to Dirks.
The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for re-
vealing Equity Funding's secrets, nor was their purpose to make a
gift of valuable information to Dirks. As the facts of this case
clearly indicate, the tippers were motivated by a desire to expose
the fraud. 39
Because the Court found that the former officer of Equity Funding did
not breach his fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to Dirks, there
was no derivative duty imposed upon Dirks to disclose or refrain from
trading on the information. 40
Other courts, however, have found the personal benefit needed to
establish a Rule lOb-5 violation. For example, the defendant in SEC v.
Gaspar,4 1 was an oil industry analyst and director of an investment banking
firm.42 Gaspar revealed confidential information to a broker friend re-
garding an upcoming tender offer. 43 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York found that Gaspar had received a
35. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 ("[T]he relationship at least must imply
such a duty."); see also SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(finding "temporary insider" where recipient received confidential information
only for corporate purposes).
36. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49 (stating facts). Interestingly, the SEC did not
charge the corporate insider with any wrongdoing. See id. at 666 n.27 (concluding
that insider received no direct or indirect personal benefit from disclosure).
37. See id. at 649.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 666-67 (footnote omitted).
40. See id. at 662 ("Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of
duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach.").
41. No. 83 Civ. 3037, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20698 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1985).
42. See id. at *1-24 (stating undisputed facts of case).
43. See id. at *27-28 (stating findings of fact).
2001]
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reputational benefit by revealing the information because the disclosure
enhanced the parties' professional relationship, as well as their existing
social relationship.
44
C. Selective Disclosure and the Stevens Complaint
After the SEC lost in Dirks, it appeared as if corporate communica-
tions with analysts enjoyed a special status.4 5 However, in SEC v. Stevens,46
the SEC again attacked the issue of selective disclosure. Stevens was the
CEO and chairman of Ultrasystems Corporation. 47 In 1984, securities
analysts criticized Stevens after the release of unexpectedly poor earn-
ings. 48 Three years later, when Stevens learned that quarterly earnings
were going to be lower than expected, he selectively disclosed that infor-
mation to several analysts one day before a public announcement. 49 The
analysts' clients were able to sell their shares and avoid over $126,000 in
losses.5 0° Focusing on the "reputational benefit" language of Dirks, the
SEC alleged that Stevens revealed the information in order to protect and
enhance his reputation with the analysts-a reputation which the SEC al-
44. See id. at *44 (finding requisite personal benefit under Dirks). The court
found that "[a]side from being friends, there existed a professional relationship
between Gaspar and Schreck .... [Gaspar] depended in part on a constant ex-
change of information with Schreck, from whom he also solicited professional
opinions. Gaspar's disclosures to Schreck continued and enhanced that profes-
sional relationship." Id.
Gaspar can likely be distinguished from routine selective disclosure-for ex-
ample, intentional release of expected earnings to a discrete group of analysts-
because the defendant in Gaspar, without authorization, disclosed information that
he knew was intended to be kept confidential. Although the Gaspar court applied
the Dirks analysis, the situation presented in Gaspar lends itself more to analysis
under the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., generally United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (setting forth misappropriation theory and reviewing prior
case law to find misappropriation theory consistent with § 10(b) and precedent);
see also, e.g., Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation Insider Trading
Cases, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000) (setting forth circumstances in which person
has duty of trust or confidence for purposes of misappropriation theory). But see
SEC v. Rubin, No. 91 Civ. 6531, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13,301, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 1993) ("The relationship here of customer and broker was sufficient itself
to create the inference of an intent to benefit .. "); In re Wentz, No. 3-6180, 1984
SEC LEXIS 2607, at *31-32 (May 15, 1984) (accepting position that tip made by
one of corporation's directors, who was also corporation's primary shareholder,
would satisfy Dirks personal benefit requirement when made with expectation that
corporation's stock price would increase).
45. See, e.g., Brountas, supra note 1, at 1529 (stating Dirks personal benefit test
insulated corporate insiders from liability); id. (stating Dirks "'contains a virtual
paean to the analysts"' (citingJohn C. Coffee,Jr., The SEC and the Securities Analysts,
N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5, 5) (quoting Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 769 (2d ed. 1988))).
46. Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451 (Mar. 19, 1991).
47. See id. at *1 (stating facts).
48. See id. at *2.
49. See id. at *2-3.
50. See id. at *1-2.
[Vol. 46: p. 645
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leged Stevens perceived as injured due to the prior criticism. 5 1 Retired by
the time the SEC brought suit in 1991, Stevens chose not to litigate the
issues and entered into an immediate consent decree under which he
agreed to disgorge $126,455.52
In conclusion, the SEC's approach to selective disclosure has evolved
from being lenient to becoming very active. 53 Under Dirks, the SEC is
required to show: that (1) the disclosure constituted a breach of the cor-
porate insider's duty to the corporation; 5 4 (2) the corporate insider re-
ceived a direct or indirect benefit by making the disclosure;55 and, finally,
to impose liability upon the recipient of information, (3) the recipient
51. See id. at *1-3 ("The [SEC's] [clomplaint alleges that Stevens perceived
this challenge as injurious to his professional reputation and as placing in jeopardy
his continued earnings power as a chief executive and a manager .... [The selec-
tive disclosure] was seen by Stevens as having direct, tangible benefit to his status as
a corporate manager.").
52. See id. at *1-2 (noting disgorgement "represent[ed] the amount of losses
avoided by those shareholders who received material nonpublic information ...
and who sold ... stock prior to the public announcement. . ."). Consequently,
selective disclosure again became a precarious activity for insiders to engage, espe-
cially in light of the SEC's ability to impose administrative sanctions. See, e.g., The
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1990) (giving SEC administrative authority to "cease and desist" and to ad-
ministratively impose civil penalties under § 21b of 1934 Act); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 7g (2000) (SEC can threaten corporate official with disbarment from service as
officer or director of public company, as well as treble damages and
disgorgement).
53. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 fn.24 (1983) (describing SEC's ap-
proach to policing corporate insiders (citing Speech of Homer Budge of the New
York Regional Group of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (Nov.
18, 1965)). Homer Budge stated:
Turning to the realm of possible defendants in the present and potential
civil actions, the Commission certainly does not contemplate suing every
person who may have come across inside information .... [Tihe Com-
mission in future cases normally should not join rank and file employees
or persons outside the company such as analysts or reporters who learn of
inside information.
Id. (emphasis added).
Less than a decade later, the Commission's position had changed dramati-
cally. See, e.g., Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman, Remarks at the University of
California, San Diego, Eighteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 24,
1991), in Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of SEC Attitudes to Securities
Analysts, 2 J. CORP. DISCLOSURE & CONFIDENTIALITY 189 (1991) ("The fact is that
the SEC does not accept Dirks .... [T]he SEC does not only want to keep com-
pany-to-analyst contacts in the status of 'a fencing match conducted on a tightrope'
... it's trying hard to electrify the tightrope." (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977)).
54. For a discussion of what constitutes a breach of a corporate insider's duty
to the corporation, see supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of direct and indirect benefits, see supra notes 21-27 and
accompanying text.
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breached a derivative duty to the corporation's shareholders by trading on
the disclosed information. 56
III. REGULATION FD: A SUMMARY AND COMPARISON TO PROPOSED
REGULATION FD
Again, Regulation FD constitutes the SEC's attempt to police the
practice of corporate insiders selectively disclosing material nonpublic in-
formation to privileged members of the Securities Industry. This Part
takes a closer look at Regulation FD and the process it prescribes.
A. Conditions to Applicability
1. Which Issuers Are Subject to Regulation FD?
To be subject to Regulation FD, an issuer must either have securities
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or must be required to
file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.5 7 This includes
closed-end investment companies, but excludes all other investment com-
panies, foreign governments and foreign private issuers. 58
2. Who Is Making the Disclosure?
Regulation FD applies only to disclosures that are made by an issuer
or a person acting on the issuer's behalf.5 9 Under the regulations, a per-
son "acting on behalf of an issuer" is defined as either: (1) "any senior
official of the issuer"60 or (2) "any other officer, employee, or agent of an
56. For a discussion of derivative duties, see supra notes 29-35 and accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, as discussed supra note 28, even if the outsider's actions
comport with the requirements of Dirks, an analyst or other corporate outsider
could be found liable for insider trading under Rule 14-e.
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (defining "issuer" for purposes of Regulation
FD).
58. See id. But see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.) (find-
ing foreign issuers remain liable for conduct that violates and meets jurisdictional
requirements of federal securities laws), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968).
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000) (setting forth individuals subject to Reg-
ulation FD's disclosure regime).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (c). Rule 101(f) defines "senior official" as "any direc-
tor, executive officer .... investor relations, public relations officers, or any other
person with similar functions." 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(f). Regarding closed-end in-
vestment companies, emphasis is placed on senior officials of the issuer's invest-
ment advisor. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (c) (emphasizing senior officials).
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issuer who regularly communicates" 6 1 with brokers, 62 dealers, 63 invest-
ment advisors, 64 investment companies65 or "holders of the issuer's securi-
ties."66 The rule is addressed only to employees whose job responsibilities
include interactions with securities professionals and securities hold-
ers, and is not intended to include communications made in the
ordinary course of business-namely, information exchanged between
a manufacturer and wholesaler. 67 To arrive at this definition, the Pro-
61. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c). The regulation expressly states that "[a]n officer,
director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic infor-
mation in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer shall not be consid-
ered to be acting on behalf of the issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c). Consequently,
Regulation FD is not applicable to disclosures made by insiders who satisfy the first
prong of the Dirks test-those receiving a "personal benefit." However, such dis-
closures are subject to the rules regarding insider trading, including the prohibi-
tions upon use of misappropriated information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1, § 78u-1
(1994) (providing liability to contemporaneous traders for insider trading and civil
penalties for insider trading). See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
660-66 (1997) (setting forth misappropriation theory). For discussion of the Dirks
test, see supra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 78c). "Broker"
includes "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others, but does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4)
(1994).
63. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1994)). A
dealer is:
[A] ny person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a
bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own ac-
count, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part
of a regular business.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (11)).
The definition of investment advisors includes: (1) investment advisors as defined
in Section 202(a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, (2) institutional in-
vestment managers, as defined in Section 13(f) (5) of the 1934 Act, that filed a
report on Form 13F for the most recent quarter ending prior to the date of the
disclosure, or (3) any persons associated with any of the above. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11) (1994) (defining term); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (5) (A) (1994) (same).
65. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (7)
(1994)). The term "investment companies" includes: (1) investment companies as
defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, (2) companies that
would be an investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7)
thereof, or (3) an affiliated person of any of the above. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (de-
fining term). For a definition of "affiliated person," see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a) (3) (C)-(F).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c).
67. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (Aug.
24, 2000) (setting forth example of analyst quizzing store manager and stating that
any disclosure "ordinarily would not trigger any Regulation FD obligations").
Note, however, that corporate insiders cannot sidestep their obligations under
Regulation FD by directing a non-covered employee to make the selective disclo-
sure. See id. ("[T]o the extent that another employee had been directed to make a
selective disclosure by a member of senior management, that member ... would
be responsible for having made the selective disclosure.").
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posed Regulation FD was "modified slightly" to "make it more pre-
cise."
68
3. What Is the Content of the Disclosure?
The applicability of Regulation FD's mandates depends not only on
who makes the disclosure, but also on what type of information is dis-
closed. 69 Regulation FD's obligations attach only to communications of
material nonpublic information about the issuer or its securities. 70 The
use of a materiality standard in Proposed Regulation FD prompted con-
flicting comments. 7' The Commission rejected the suggestion of includ-
68. Id. (stating proposed rule included any employee and noting adverse
comments received); see also E-mail from Stanley Keller, Chair, Committee on Fed-
eral Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion et al., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (May 8, 2000), at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/proposed/s73199/keller2.htm [hereinafter American Bar Association
E-mail] ("Unauthorized communications of material, nonpublic information by
lower-level employees typically should not bring the company within the ambit of
Regulation FD."); E-mail from Richard M. Starr, Chair, and Gregory H. Mathews,
Vice Chair, Corporate and Securities Law Committee of the American Corporate
Counsel Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 27, 2000), at http:/
/www.sec.gov/reules/proposed/s73199/starrl.htm [hereinafter Corporate Coun-
sel E-mail] ("[T] he proposed definition ... seems unduly vague and imprecise.").
69. For a discussion of whom Regulation FD is designed to regulate, see supra
notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
70. See General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100; Se-
lective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 ("The final regula-
tion, like the proposal, applies to disclosures of 'material nonpublic' information
about the issuer or its securities."). Consequently, the Commission stressed, Regu-
lation FD would not apply to communications of immaterial information made to
an analyst who, "through some combination of persistence, knowledge, and in-
sight," creates a "mosaic" of information that, when combined, is material. See 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (discussing communications outside of Regulation FD). Regu-
lation FD, however, does not set forth statutory definitions of material or nonpub-
lic, instead opting to rely on definitions crafted through case law. See id. at 51,721.
For a further discussion of case law defining material and nonpublic, see supra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
71. Compare E-mail from Philip D. Ameen, Chairman, Committee on Corpo-
rate Reporting, Financial Executive Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Apr. 24, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/ameenl.htm
("We . . . support the [rielease's approach to rely on existing standards for the
term 'material nonpublic information.' Materiality is inevitably a judgment call
.... We do not believe [a] definition beyond what is already in the release would
change this circumstance."), and E-mail from Bradley W. Skolnik, President, North
American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"), to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/
skolnikl.htm ("An attempt by the Commission to define 'materiality' . . . could
have broader implications."), with E-mail from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73199/clearyl.htm [hereinafter Cleary E-mail] ("[f]t is not good policy
to require issuers to make materialityjudgments in connection with these kinds of
communications .... "), and American Bar Association E-mail, supra note 68
("[Materiality] is a difficult, subjective analysis ... even more difficult when made
on a real time basis .... The combined impact... will be to discourage communi-
cation."). To address concerns of discouraging communication and increasing liti-
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ing a bright line standard, but, in response to requests for more
interpretive guidance, set forth a list of the types of information it believes
are especially likely to be considered "material." 72 In addition, Regulation
FD's requirement of "intentional" conduct also applies to the determina-
tion of materiality. 73
4. Who Was the Disclosure's Recipient?
As proposed, Regulation FD applied to disclosures of material non-
public information to "any other person outside the issuer."74 Many com-
menters found the scope of the proposed rule too broad and several
gation, the SEC included a number of suggestions in Proposed Regulation FD. See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,595-96 (Dec. 28,
1999) (listing suggestions). They included: (1) limiting the number of persons
authorized to make disclosures or field inquiries; (2) keeping a record of all com-
munications made; (3) declining to respond to inquiries that raise questions of
materiality until corporate insiders can consult with counsel; (4) securing agree-
ments from analysts to abstain from using any information disclosed until the is-
suer can determine the communications' materiality; and (5) capitalizing on
Regulation FD's treatment of unintentional communications. See id.
72. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (de-
clining to adopt bright line test). The Commission stated:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires
the exercise ofjudgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securi-
ties acts and Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that designates a
single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-
specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be over or
underinclusive.
Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)). The Commission
listed a wide variety of possible material information. See id. The list includes:
(1) Earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint
ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or devel-
opments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or loss of
a contract); (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change in au-
ditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an
auditor's audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities-e.g.,
defaults on senior securities, calls of securities for redemption, repur-
chase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, changes to the rights of
security holders, public or private sales of additional securities; and (7)
bankruptcies or receiverships.
Id. The listing demonstrates some types of material that may require more scru-
tiny, but it is not meant to be exhaustive. See id. (noting that complete listing is not
possible). However, the SEC did emphasize that communications with analysts re-
garding earnings forecasts assume a "high degree of risk" and will likely violate
Regulation FD. See id.
73. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 ("As
commenters suggested, this aspect of the regulation provides additional protection
that issuers need not fear being second-guessed by the Commission in enforce-
ment actions for mistaken judgments about materiality in close cases."). For dis-
cussion of what constitutes "intentional" conduct under Regulation FD, see infra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
74. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594
(describing Proposed Regulation FD).
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offered alternative methods for defining the class of recipients subject to
Regulation FD. 75 The Commission was persuaded by the comments re-
ceived, and narrowed Regulation FD's scope to include only disclosures to
the categories of person listed in Rule 100(b) (1). 7 6
Furthermore, Rule 100(b)(2) provides four exceptions from cover-
age. 77 First, Regulation FD does not apply to disclosures made to those
75. See, e.g., American Bar Association E-mail, supra note 68 ("[I]ssuers will
face an unacceptable burden in conducting their ordinary business communica-
tions while they attempt to comply with proposed Regulation FD. This result prob-
ably was not intended by the Commission, but the rule as proposed provides no
exclusion for such business communications."); E-mail from Margaret M. Foran,
Chairman, Securities Law Committee and James W. Guedry, Chairman, Selective
Disclosure Subcommittee, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73199/foranl.htm [hereinafter Corporate Secretaries E-mail] ("We would like
the regulation narrowed ....").
Commenters suggested a wide variety of recipient exemptions. See, e.g., E-mail
from Peter G. Skinner, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, DowJones
& Company, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/skinnerl.htm (proffering "bona fide news
organizations" exemption); E-mail from Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice Presi-
dent and Chief Rating Officer, Standard and Poor's Ratings Services, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 17, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73199/tillmanl.htm (suggesting exclusion for information received in process of
securities rating); see also Corporate Secretaries E-mail, supra (submitting that Reg-
ulation FD be limited to "discussions by persons who regularly communicate with
the investing public to non-issuer personnel who regularly make or might reasona-
bly be expected to make investment decisions involving the issuer's securities").
76. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719 (ac-
knowledging that "these comments have merit"); 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000) (list-
ing categories of recipients subject to rule and excluding, among others,
disclosures made "[t]o an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit
ratings, provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing
a credit rating"); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,720 n.27 (discussing basis for non-inclusion of certain categories). The SEC
explained that "Rule 100(b) (1) will cover the types of persons most likely to be the
recipients of improper selective disclosure, but should not cover persons who are
engaged in ordinary-course business communications with the issuer, or interfere
with disclosures to the media or communications to government agencies." Id. at
51,720.
The SEC further explained:
While it is conceivable that a representative of a customer, supplier, stra-
tegic partner, news organization, or government agency could be a secur-
ity holder of the issuer, it ordinarily would not be foreseeable for the
issuer engaged in an ordinary-course business-related communication
with that person to expect the person to buy or sell the issuer's securities
on the basis of the communication. Indeed, if such a person were to
trade on the basis of material nonpublic information obtained in his or
her representative capacity, the person likely would be liable under the
misappropriation theory of insider trading.
Id. at 51,720 n.27. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660-66
(1997) (discussing possible liability arising from misappropriated inside
information).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2) (setting forth exemptions).
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who owe a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer. 78 Second, an issuer
can avoid Regulation FD scrutiny by securing an express agreement to
maintain confidentiality of information disclosed. 79 Third, information
disclosed to ratings agencies in the course of a securities rating is ex-
empted. 80 Finally, Rule 100(b) (2) excludes from Regulation FD coverage
information disclosed in connection with most offerings of securities regis-
tered under the Securities Act.81
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b) (2) (i) (stating one exception). This exemption
embodies the "temporary insider" concept set forth in Dirks. For a discussion of
the "temporary insider" concept, see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b) (2) (ii) (setting forth exemption). The agree-
ment must be express, but does not necessarily have to be written. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 n.28 ("[A]n express oral
agreement will suffice."). Furthermore, the agreement may be obtained after the
disclosure has been made, so long as the recipient has not disclosed or traded on
the basis of the information received. See id. (explaining rule). Consequently, if
an issuer mistakenly reveals material nonpublic information, the issuer can avoid
violating Regulation FD by obtaining from the recipient an express agreement to
maintain confidentiality. See id.
Furthermore, although an issuer may have obtained a confidentiality agree-
ment from only a single individual within a larger organization, the issuer is not
treated as communicating the information to the entire organization. See id. at
51,720 n.29 (describing example of information disclosed to investment banker
and explaining that information is not considered disclosed to other parts of that
investment banker's firm-for example analysts and other personnel involved with
sales). On the other hand, obtaining such an agreement would not permit disclo-
sure to others within the recipient's organization. See id. (stating confidentiality
agreement applicable only to recipient).
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii) (setting forth exemption). The Com-
mission set forth two justifications for this exemption. See Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720 (setting forth rationale). First, the Com-
mission noted that it was not aware of any incidents of selective disclosure involv-
ing ratings agencies. See id. Second, it emphasized rating agencies' "mission of
public disclosure" with an objective to widely publicize the rating when complete.
See id. Furthermore, it noted that the exemption for ratings agencies is available
only when the agencies make their credit ratings "publicly available." See id.
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b) (2) (iv) (excluding from exemption registered
shelf offerings under Rule 415(a)(1)(i)-(vi)). The disclosed information must re-
late to the registered offering for the exemption to apply. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(b) (2) (iv) (stating rule). For example, an issuer that discloses to analysts
news of an upcoming merger can not rely upon this exemption solely because the
issuer is concurrently engaged in a registered offering. See id.
The Proposed Regulation FD included disclosures made in connection with
an offering of securities under the Securities Act. See Selective Disclosure and In-
sider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. At 72,590, 72,598 (Dec. 28, 1999) ("For example, the
[Proposed] Regulation FD would apply to statements made in a 'roadshow' for a
reporting issuer's offering. In that situation, if an issuer made oral selective disclo-
sure of material information, [Proposed] Regulation FD would require the issuer
also to make public disclosure of the same information."). Critics expressed con-
cern that disclosures required under Proposed Regulation FD would violate Sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act. See, e.g., American Bar Association E-mail, supra note
68 ("The concerns arise because a disclosure made to satisfy the requirements of
Regulation FD may be deemed to be an 'offer' of the issuer's securities for pur-
poses of Section 5 of the Securities Act and the required dissemination may be a
'prospectus."'). As a result, the Commission chose to remove communications
2001]
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B. Required Disclosure
1. Intentional Versus Non-Intentional Disclosures: Timing of Required Public
Disclosure
Regulation FD differentiates between disclosures made intentionally
and disclosures made inadvertently.82 In the case of an intentional disclo-
sure, Regulation FD requires that the issuer simultaneously make a public
disclosure of the information.8 3 A disclosure is "intentional" if the issuer
or any person acting on behalf of the issuer "knows, or is reckless in not
knowing, that the information being disclosed is both material and non-
public."8 4 Regarding inadvertent, or non-intentional disclosures, Regula-
made in connection with registered offerings from Regulation FD's purview. See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725 ("[W]e have deter-
mined that our concerns about selective disclosure ... should not be addressed by
overlaying Regulation FD onto the system of regulation provided by [the Securi-
ties] Act. The mandated disclosure regime and the civil liability provisions of the
Securities Act reduce substantially any meaningful opportunity for . . .selective
disclosure ...."). Further, the Commission has defined when registered offerings
are deemed to begin and end for purposes of Regulation FD. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.101(g) (2000) (setting forth beginning and end of underwritten and non-
underwritten offerings). Conversely, unregistered offerings of securities are not
exempt from Regulation FD. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,725 ("We believe that reporting companies making unregistered offer-
ings should either publicly disclose the material information they disclose nonpub-
licly or ...hav[e] those who receive it agree to maintain it in confidence.").
Consequently, if an issuer selectively discloses material nonpublic information dur-
ing an unregistered offering, without obtaining a confidentiality agreement, the
issuer will be required to make prompt public disclosure regardless of whether
such disclosure would make unavailable the exemption under which the securities
are being offered. See id. (advising that issuer consult with corporate counsel re-
garding possible consequences of selective disclosure).
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (stating rule).
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 243(a) (1) (2000) (same). For a discussion of what consti-
tutes public disclosure, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (defining "intentional"). The Commission
stressed that the knowing/reckless standard applies to both the determination of
materiality and whether the information was nonpublic. See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (noting that the context of a disclosure
is relevant to the determination of whether an issuer was reckless in making mate-
riality judgment); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,726 n.90 (noting that existence of policy regarding selective disclosure, and is-
suer's adherence thereto, are relevant in determining issuer's intent).
The inclusion of reckless conduct in the Proposed Rule elicited a number of
negative comments. See, e.g., Corporate Counsel E-mail, supra note 68 ("We are
extremely concerned with this aspect of the proposal that would incorporate 'reck-
lessness' into the definition of 'intentional' .... Recklessness as a legal concept
has not offered clear guidance to corporations seeking to comply with prescribed
standards of conduct."); Corporate Secretaries E-mail, supra note 75 ("[We] worry
that 'reckless in not knowing' is susceptible of [sic] being interpreted with twenty-
twenty hindsight as something more akin to 'negligent in not knowing."'). Despite
the comments, the Commission adopted the recklessness standard in the final ver-
sion of Regulation FD. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (stating recklessness standard);
see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 ("Since
recklessness suffices to meet the mental state requirement even for purposes of the
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tion FD requires prompt public disclosure. 85 Failure to make the required
disclosure can subject the issuer and/or the person responsible for the
disclosure to various administrative penalties. 8
6
2. "Public Disclosure"
Regulation FD takes a very flexible approach to what constitutes a
sufficient "public disclosure."8 7 It allows issuers to make public disclosures
for purposes of Regulation FD by filing or furnishing88 a report on Form
antifraud provisions, we believe it is appropriate to retain recklessness in Regula-
tion FD's definition of 'intentional' as well.") (footnote omitted).
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2) (stating rule). "Promptly" is defined as:
as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24
hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York
Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer ... learns that there
has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on
behalf of the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is
reckless in not knowing, is both material and nonpublic.
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d).
Presumably, the definition would include not only situations where the issuer
learns of a disclosure, but also instances where the issuer is reckless in not learning
of a disclosure; or intentionally avoids learning of the disclosure. See Selective Dis-
closure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (stressing the practical applica-
tion of Regulation FD to prevent issuers from sidestepping their Regulation FD
obligations). The Commission received a variety of opinions from commenters
concerning the twenty-four hour time limitation. Compare E-mail from Gretchen
Sprigg Wisehart, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/wiseharl.htm (agreeing with twenty-four
hour standard), with Corporate Secretaries E-mail, supra note 75 (finding twenty-
four hour period too short), and Corporate Counsel E-mail, supra note 68 (stating
that time period prescribed was too specific).
86. For discussion of the liability that results from violating Regulation FD,
see infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Note, however, that under Rule 103,
failure to make a disclosure under Regulation FD will neither render the issuer
ineligible for short form registration on Form S-2 and S-3, nor will it invalidate
resales under Rule 144. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.103 (2000); see also Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725-26 ("[T]he purpose [of Regulation
FD] is not well served by negatively affecting a company's ability to access the capi-
tal markets. Nor is it well served by penalizing the shareholders or employees of
the company.").
87. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723
(describing Proposed Regulation FD as providing "considerable flexibility.").
88. See id. at 51,723 (discussing alternatives under Regulation FD's public dis-
closure requirement). Regulation FD offers two alternatives. First, an issuer may
choose to "file" a report under Item 5 of Form 8-K. If so, the information provided
will be subject to: (1) liability under Section 18 of the Exchange Act; (2) automatic
incorporation by reference into the issuer's Securities Act registration statements,
thereby subject to liability under Section 11 and Section 12 (a) (2) of the Securities
Act; and (3) the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See id. Alterna-
tively, the issuer may choose to "furnish" a report under Item 9 of Form 8-K that
will not be deemed "filed." See id. Information "furnished" is not subject to liabil-
ity under Section 11 of the Securities Act or Section 18 of the Exchange Act, but
remains subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See id.
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8-K89 or by disseminating the information "through another method (or
combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to pro-
vide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the
public."9 0
89. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,596
(Dec. 24, 1999) (proposing new Item 10 to Form 8-K). Many commenters ex-
pressed concern that a separate Item 10 filing would be construed as an admission
on behalf of the issuer regarding the materiality of the information disclosed. See,
e.g., Corporate Counsel E-mail, supra note 68 ("[A] new Item 10 could be used as
an admission of materiality by the plaintiffs' bar to the detriment of an issuer in
other contexts, [for instance] a fraud on the market suit for delayed disclosure.");
Corporate Secretaries E-mail, supra note 75 (same); Cleary E-mail, supra note 71
("We do not believe this change to Form 8-K would be necessary or helpful."); E-
mail from Bonnie Burdett Dennis, Chairman of the Board, and Louis M. Thomp-
son, Jr., President & CEO, National Investor Relations Institute, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 11, 2000), at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/dennisl.htm ("[We believe] that the pro-
posed Item 10 is not necessary and could pose problems .. "). Consequently, the
Commission expressly provided in the Final Rule Release that the materiality of
information filed or furnished on Form 8-K, for the purpose of satisfying Regula-
tion FD, will not be deemed admitted simply because of the filing. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (discussing effect of Form
8-K filing or furnishing).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2000) (defining "public disclosure"); see also Se-
lective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723-24 (providing gui-
dance as to acceptable methods of public disclosure). Such methods include
widely distributed press releases and conference calls that the public is able to
attend (either in person or by means of a telephone or the Internet), provided,
however, that the public is given adequate notice of the disclosure. See 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,723-24 (emphasizing that sufficiency of methods will depend upon par-
ticular circumstances of individual issuers). The Commission, however, noted that
because many investors do not have access to the Internet, a posting upon the
issuer website, alone, would in most cases be insufficient. See id. ("As technology
evolves .. .some issuers . . .could use such a method.").
In the Final Regulation FD release, the Commission offered a model for dis-
closure of material information. See id. at 51,724. The Commission stated:
By following these steps, an issuer can use the press release to provide the
initial broad distribution of the information, and then discuss its release
with analysts in the subsequent conference call, without fear that if it
should disclose additional material details related to the original disclo-
sure it will be engaging in a selective disclosure of material information.
Id.
The Commission suggested the issuer first issue a press release through "regu-
lar channels." See id. (explaining model for disclosure). Second, the issuer should
give notice to the general public of a conference call scheduled to discuss the
information. See id. Such notice should include instructions regarding accessing
the call. See id. Finally, the issuer should hold the conference call, providing ac-
cess to the general public. See id. (same). But see id. at 51,724 n.71 ("Giving the
public the opportunity to listen to the call does not also require that the issuer give
all members of the public the opportunity to ask questions.").
Whether an issuer's method of disclosure is "reasonably" designed to produce
broad, non-discretionary dissemination of information depends upon "all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances." Id. at 51,724. This includes whether the issuer's
press releases are routinely carried by major business wire services and whether the
method chosen constitutes a deviation from the issuer's prior practice of distribut-
ing information. See id.
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3. Interaction with Liability Under the Federal Securities Law
Regulation FD creates duties of disclosure under Sections 13(a) and
15(d) of the Exchange Act, as well as Section 30 of the Investment Com-
pany Act.9 1 It does not, however, create duties under the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws or create private rights of action against
noncompliant issuers.9 2 Issuers who violate Regulation FD are "subject to
an SEC enforcement action alleging violations of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Exchange Act ... and Regulation FD." 93 The SEC can choose to
bring either an administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order or a
civil action seeking an injunction and/or civil monetary penalties.94 Also,
in some instances, the individual responsible for the disclosure may be
subject to a separate enforcement action. 95
IV. REGULATION FD: MARKET ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS
OF FAIRNESS
A. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Noise and Regulation TD
1. Regulation FD and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
To assess the probable impact of the Commission's adoption of Regu-
lation FD, it is helpful to pose the question in light of established theories
relating to the market and market participant behavior.96
91. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 (dis-
cussing liability issues surrounding Regulation FD).
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000) ("No failure to make a public disclosure
required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 ...."
(emphasis added)); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,726 ("Accordingly, private plaintiffs cannot rely on an issuer's violation of
Regulation FD as a basis for a private action alleging Rule lob-5 violations."). Fur-
thermore, focusing on the "required solely by" language of Rule 102, the Commis-
sion has stressed that Regulation FD "does not affect any existing grounds for
[imposing] liability under Rule lOb-5." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. The Commission set forth four examples. First, 10b-5 lia-
bility could be imposed for selective disclosure made under circumstances that
meet the Dirks "personal benefit" test. See id. Second, failure to make a disclosure
may constitute a breach of duty under the "duty to correct" or the "duty to update"
theory. See id. Third, extensive involvement with an analyst can subject the issuer
to liability under the "entanglement" theory. See id. Fourth, Regulation FD does
not provide protection from Rule l0b-5 liability when a disclosure made pursuant
to Regulation FD either contains false or misleading information, or omits mate-
rial information. See id.
93. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
94. See id. (describing possible courses of action).
95. See id. (stating that such individuals could be held responsible "either as 'a
cause of' the violation in a cease-and-desist proceeding, or as an aider and abettor
of the violation in a injunctive action." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 51,726
n.91 ("A failure to file ... will be considered a violation for as long as the failure
continues; in our enforcement actions, we likely will seek more severe sanctions for
violations that continue for a longer period of time.").
96. For a discussion of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"),
see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. The following descriptions of the
2001]
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One of the most developed theories concerning the manner in which
capital markets react to regulatory, and thereby informational, changes is
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (the "ECMH"). 9 7 Generally, the
ECMH states that efficient markets value securities at a level that reflects
publicly available information regarding those securities, even if not all
market participants have access to the information." Furthermore, an ef-
ficient market impounds new information regarding a security into the
security's price so quickly that individual buyers and sellers gain no advan-
tage by possessing the information.99
Since its conception, the ECMH has been parsed into three discrete
categories of market efficiency: the "weak form," the "semi-strong form"
and the "strong form." 100 First, the market is efficient in the weak form
when the price of a security reflects all information previously impounded
into the security's price.' 01 If so, investors cannot predict a securities fu-
ture price by looking at previous pricing information. Second, the semi-
strong form of market efficiency occurs when security prices include all
information publicly available. 10 2 Third, the market is efficient in the
strong form when prices embody all information concerning a security,
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and the Noise Theory are not intended to be
exhaustive recantations of each theory's intricacies. However, recitation of the
principal concepts of each provides an amiable structure in which to assess Regula-
tion FD's probable impact.
97. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
31-38 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing ECMH). The ECMH has been used as the basis for
administrative policy and judicial decisions. See, e.g., Proposed Rulemaking to Im-
plement the Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release Nos. 6331-38,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,016, at 84,479 (Aug. 6,
1981) ("Proposed Form S-3 relies on the efficient market theory .... "); Wielgos v.
Commw. Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The Securities and Ex-
change Commission believes that markets correctly value the securities of well-fol-.
lowed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has been digested and
expressed in the security's price."); see also Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evi-
dence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) ("[T]here is no other
proposition in economics which has more empirical evidence supporting it than
the efficient market hypothesis.").
98. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 552-54 (1984). "Information" has been defined
broadly as "data that has the capacity to alter one's beliefs about the world or, in
our more limited context, one's beliefs about the appropriate price of an asset."
Id. at 561.
99. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 555 ("'[A]vailable information'
does not support profitable trading strategies or arbitrage opportunities.").
100. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (discussing subsets of efficient capital markets
hypothesis).
101. See Cox ET AL., supra note 97, at 32-33 (describing weak form market
efficiency).
102. See id. at 33 (same). The semi-strong form is considered to be the most
validated of the three variations. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions,
and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 852 n.7
(1992) (describing Fama's three-part typology of efficiency testing).
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"whether that information is publicly available or not."'0 3 Although a
number of studies have demonstrated that markets respond efficiently to a
wide variety of information, few have shown the cause for such
efficiency. 1
0 4
In 1984, Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman identified four
models of market mechanisms that can cause capital markets to operate
efficiently. 10 5 These mechanisms are referred to as "universally informed
trading,"1 0 6 "professionally informed trading,"' 0 7 "derivatively informed
103. See Cox ET AL., supra note 97, at 33 (describing strong form of market
efficiency).
104. See Fama, supra note 100, at 404-09 (reviewing empirical tests); see also
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 551-52 (stating that research demonstrating
market efficiency has "outpaced efforts to explain the phenomenon," and conse-
quently, "legal users of the ECMH literature have been.., confronted with a body
of empirical evidence in search of a causative theory"). Note, however, that much
of the empirical research supporting the ECMH has been challenged by behav-
ioral researchers who argue that the ECMH is based upon the flawed assumption
that investors act rationally when trading. See generally Langevoort, supra note 102,
at 858-61 (describing laboratory tests that have demonstrated investors do not act
rationally when trading). For a discussion of this research, see infra notes 137-38
and accompanying text.
105. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 566 (identifying mechanisms).
The authors set forth three features of the relationships amongst the identified
mechanisms. First, the mechanisms ordinarily operate one at a time to instill new
information into prices. See id. at 567 (setting forth "critical" features of relation
among market mechanisms). Second, which mechanism will dominate depends
upon how widely a piece of information is distributed. See id. Third, the speed at
which each mechanism operates is a function of the breadth of the initial distribu-
tion. See id.
106. Id. at 568. Universally informed trading is the simplest form of efficiency
mechanisms "in which all traders are, in fact, costlessly and simultaneously in-
formed." Id. This mechanism can be used to explain market efficiency in the
context of "weak-form," or "old," information. Id. at 569. Because all traders are
privy to the information, such information will be embodied in the security's price,
foreclosing any opportunity by individual investors to make a profit based upon
the information. See id. at 568 (describing mechanism).
107. Id. at 569-72. The professionally informed trading mechanism embodies
in prices information that is not universally disseminated among traders. See id.
(describing mechanism). Such information is capitalized upon by market profes-
sionals, whose significant trading volume assures its rapid assimilation into price.
See id. ("[R]apid price equilibration does not require widespread dissemination of
information, but only a minority of knowledgeable traders who control a critical
volume of trading activity."). This mechanism, according to Gilson and Kraakman,
accounts for the market's efficiency in the semi-strong form. See id. at 572.
2001] COMMENT 665
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trading"10 8 and "uninformed trading."10 9 Rather than being alternatives,
all four mechanisms potentially operate with respect to a certain piece of
information, with the identity and the efficiency of the exact mechanism
dependent upon the breadth of the initial distribution of the information
among traders. 1 0 Gilson and Kraakman further propose that the breadth
of the initial distribution is determined by the relative cost of providing
such information; such costs are established in the "information mar-
ket."' I As information costs decrease, the breadth of the initial distribu-
tion will increase.1 12 Consequently, it follows, that as information costs
decrease, the market becomes more efficient because more-and better-
information is distributed and the increased distribution triggers a more
efficient capital market mechanism. 113
108. Id. at 572-79. This mechanism accounts for security prices reflecting in-
formation not generally available to the public. See id. (describing mechanism).
As insiders capitalize upon nonpublic information, investors who lack the informa-
tional advantage can derive the nonpublic information two ways: trade decoding
and price decoding. See id. at 573. Trade decoding occurs when uniformed trad-
ers directly observe the transactions of informed traders. See id. (defining term).
For example, if an individual shareholder observes a member of the board selling
a significant portion of the director's interest in the company (based on negative
nonpublic information), that shareholder will glean the negative information from
the trade. Similarly, price decoding occurs when uninformed traders, without
knowing the identity of those with an informational advantage, glean nonpublic
information from changes in a security's price and trading volume. See id. at 574-
75 (defining term).
109. Id. at 579-88. The uninformed trading mechanism explains how prices
come to reflect "soft" information-information such as forecasts and predictions,
which by definition is unknown to all traders. See id. (describing mechanism). It
states that traders form forecasts based upon secondary sources and individual bi-
ases that are unique to the individual. See id. at 579-81. As the number of traders,
and consequently the number of individual forecasts, increases, individual biases
cancel one another out, resulting in a single, "best-informed aggregate forecast."
See id. at 581 ("[Uinsystematic bias 'washes out' over trading .... "). Note, how-
ever, that if individual erroneous biases become systematic or prevalent, this expla-
nation of market efficiency begins to falter. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 862
("[S] uboptimal behavior that is common and predictable will not be of the ran-
dom sort that ... will cancel out.").
110. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 592 ("[W]e expect the breadth
of the initial distribution of information among traders to determine the relative
efficiency of the market's response.").
111. See id. at 593 ("The lower the cost of particular information, the wider
will be its distribution, the more effective will be the capital market mechanism
operating to reflect it in prices, and the more efficient will be the market with
respect to it.").
112. See id. (stating "the information market... determines how information
is initially distributed").
113. See id. at 611 ("As information costs decline ... the market becomes
more efficient, both because the information is better and because its wider distri-
bution triggers a more effective capital market mechanism.").
[Vol. 46: p. 645
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Focusing on information costs identifies three categories of costs:
"costs of acquisition."1 14 "costs of processing"' 15 and "costs of verifica-
tion."11 6 If market efficiency is conceptualized as a function of informa-
tion costs, market participants will-and do-strive to economize such
information costs. 1 1 7 Judged in light of this conceptualization of market
efficiency, Regulation FD is advantageous because, while it may lead to an
increase in processing costs, it will likely lead to significant decreases in
acquisition and verification costs.
To begin, Regulation FD's impact upon acquisition costs must be as-
sessed from the standpoint of both issuers disseminating information and
the information's subsequent recipients. 118 The Commission has esti-
mated that the total costs of preparing the prescribed Form 8-K disclo-
sures for all issuers affected by Regulation FD will be approximately
$49,562,500.119 Whether, and to what extent, these costs exceed the cur-
114. See id. at 594. Individual information acquisition costs differ depending
on whether the individual is the originator of the information or a subsequent
recipient. See id. (noting that costs will differ "in character"). Acquisition costs for
an originator include all costs required to produce the information. See id. (noting
examples of "discovery or innovation"). For the subsequent recipient, acquisition
costs are the cost of obtaining the information from someone else. See id. (noting
accomplishment regardless of "originator's cooperation").
115. See id. ("[P] rocessing costs are best exemplified by investment in human
capital. Evaluation of information, whether self-produced or acquired from
others, requires special skills . . . that can ordinarily be obtained only through
investment in expensive professional training.").
116. See id. Verification costs, like acquisition costs, depend upon the identity
of the individual in question. For originators of information, verification costs in-
clude resources expended to determine the accuracy of existing information. See
id. at 594-95 (separating verification costs categorically). For a subsequent recipi-
ent, most verification costs will be devoted to establishing the veracity of the origi-
nator. See id.
117. See id. at 597-605 (identifying attempts to reduce acquisition, processing
and verification costs). Attempts to economize information costs have been estab-
lished for each category of costs. Looking first to acquisition costs, the market
economizes acquisition costs in a variety of ways. For example, acquisition costs
are economized by cooperative programs whereby corporate insiders address a
number of analysts at once, thereby reducing the acquisition costs incurred by
individual analysts. See id. at 600 (setting forth example). Also, the mandatory
disclosure scheme of the Exchange Act eliminates substantial acquisition costs by
directing issuers to make specific disclosures. See id. at 601. Second, consider how
the market economizes processing costs. Analysts themselves are the prime exam-
ple of such canonization; through special training, analysts are able to process in-
formation more efficiently than individual investors. See id. at 601. Finally, the
market economizes verification costs in a number of ways ranging from the use of
professionals (such as lawyers and accountants) to verify information to advertis-
ing, and from agency approval (such as securities ratings) to imposition of civil
and criminal penalties upon fraudulent producers of information. See id. at 602-
05.
118. For a discussion of acquisition costs, see supra note 114.
119. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,731-
33 (Aug. 24, 2000) (weighing costs and benefits of Regulation FD). The Commis-
sion based its estimate upon the anticipation that issuers will make one Regulation
FD disclosure each quarter as well as one additional disclosure per year. See id. at
2001]
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rent costs of selectively disclosing information cannot be accurately quanti-
fied. The estimated costs, however, can likely be significantly reduced by
utilizing other permissible alternative methods of disclosure, such as press
releases or webcasting over the Internet. 120 Furthermore, any increase in
51,732 n.154 (stating basis for estimates). The Commission concluded that issuers
would incur approximately $762.50 in costs to prepare each Form 8-K filing and
that, while some issuers will make more than five annual Regulation FD disclo-
sures, a "substantial number of issuers will make fewer than five [Regulation] FD
disclosures annually." Id. Many commenters criticized the Commission's estimates
as unfounded and baseless. See, e.g., Letter from Bond Market Association, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000)
(available at Commission's Public Reference Room) (finding Proposed Regulation
FD's estimate of legal involvement too low and stating that cost of compliance will
be much greater than anticipated). But see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trad-
ing, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731-32 (revising estimates and finding estimates "appropri-
ate"; "[W] e estimated the average number of hours ... by contacting a number of
law firms and other persons regularly involved in completing the form. We there-
fore believe that our estimate is appropriate.").
The Commission addressed the potential costs of implementing a corporate
policy relating to disclosure and found that such costs would not be substantial. See
id. at 51,732. The Commission explained:
Many issuers already consult with in-house and/or outside counsel re-
garding their disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws.
Moreover, as we have narrowed the definition of "persons acting on be-
half of the issuer" to cover only those who regularly interact with securi-
ties market professionals and security holders, the issuer personnel whose
disclosures will be covered by the regulation are those who are most likely
to be well-versed in disclosure issues and practiced in making judgments
on these issues. Further, to the extent that issuers already have policies in
place to cover the types of disclosures those personnel can make, we ex-
pect the additional costs associated with compliance to be small.
Id.
120. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,732
("[W]e anticipate that other methods of disclosure, such as press releases, may
require less preparation time than a Form 8-K . . . . Moreover, if the costs of
another method of disclosure are less than the costs of filing the Form 8-K, we
presume issuers will choose another method of public disclosure."). Proposed
Regulation FD's commenters disputed the costs associated with use of the Internet.
Compare E-mail from Bradley Richardson, Co-Manager, The Nibelung Fund LLC,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 21,
2000, 21:07 EST), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/richard1.txt
("[T]he cost of full disclosure is quite minimal given the ever lower cost of using
the Internet."), and E-mail from Robert Bannon, CFA Director, Relations Net2000
Communications, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/bannonl.
txt ("[T] here are several services that will make the audio from conference calls
available to the general public over the Internet for no cost."), with Letter from
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary, Securities and Exchange Commission (available at Commission's Public Ref-
erence Room) (finding webcasts costly and stating use of new technologies entails
additional costs).
Note, further, that Regulation FD does not require that the issuer incur any
acquisition costs-only that the issuer incur those costs disseminating information
on a non-selective basis. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,731 (stating that, as result of Regulation FD's voluntary structure, exact esti-
mate of number of issuers who will make Regulation FD disclosures is uncertain).
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acquisition costs incurred by the issuer would pale in comparison to the
decrease in acquisition costs that will be realized by analysts and individual
investors.
First, analysts can expect their overall acquisition costs to decrease.
Due to the intensive nature of acquiring information from issuers, an ana-
lyst is limited in the number of issuers he or she can follow. 12 1 Regulation
FD, however, economizes acquisition costs by granting that analyst access
to the fruits of another analyst's labor. 122 Consequently, although the cost
of following the analyst's current group of issuers would likely remain con-
stant, the analyst's costs in following additional issuers are reduced signifi-
cantly, thereby allowing the analyst to follow additional issuers or decrease
the cost of his or her services. 123
Second, individual investors will recognize a similar decrease in acqui-
sition costs. Prior to Regulation FD, individual investors could discover
the existence-and the likely significance-of selectively disclosed, mate-
rial nonpublic information only by costly and speculative decoding of ei-
ther known trades made by corporate insiders or price fluctuations in the
issuer's securities. 1 24 Regulation FD's requirement of broad dissemina-
tion ensures that individual investor acquisition costs will be minimal,
likely resulting in an increase in market participants. 125
Next, under Regulation FD, individual investors will incur additional
processing costs, while analyst's processing costs will remain constant. Be-
cause Regulation FD embraces a materiality standard, issuers will likely
make public disclosure of all borderline information, the materiality of
which is subject to question. 12 6 As a result, individual investors will have to
121. See Lewis D. Solomon & Dan Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule lOb-5:
Legal Standards, Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43
FORDHAM L. REv. 505, 512-19 (1975) (detailing analysts' role in capital markets).
122. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000) (requiring broad public
disclosure).
123. Commenters expressed concern that Regulation FD would chill commu-
nications between issuers and the investment community, making it more difficult
for analysts to obtain information and thereby leading to an increase in analysts'
acquisition costs. See, e.g., E-mail from American Electronics Association, Futures
Industry Association, Institute of International Bankers, Securities Industry Associ-
ation, The Bond Market Association, toJonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Securities Industry] (stating
that "[Regulation FD] could prove to be a setback for the free flow of corporate
information to the markets)"; American Bar Association E-mail, supra note 68 (stat-
ing Commission "runs a significant risk of chilling the accelerating pace of infor-
mation flow to the markets" by adopting Regulation FD).
124. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 569-72 (explaining process of
"professionally informed trading").
125. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (stating potential market participants not likely to enter capital market if
they perceive it as stacked against them). The Schlanger court asked, "Who would
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" Id.
126. See, e.g., Corporate Counsel E-mail, supra note 68 ("No doubt there will
be many instances where corporations will err on the safe side and file an 8-K
2001] 669
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gauge the materiality of Regulation FD disclosures, as well as the signifi-
cance of such information, thereby increasing individual processing costs.
Conversely, an analyst's processing costs will remain constant; he or she
will receive the same information, possibly in a different format.
Finally, Regulation FD will have a beneficial, if not benign, effect
upon verification costs for issuers, analysts and individual investors. Regu-
lation FD does not create an additional duty to update; therefore, issuers
will not expend additional resources to ensure existing information is ac-
curate. 127 Likewise, analysts' verification costs are likely to remain con-
stant because the issuer remains the source of information. 128 On the
other hand, verification costs of individual investors will drop precipitously
because Regulation FD obviates the need for third party originators. 129
To summarize, a number of different capital market mechanisms op-
erate to ensure market efficiency. 130 In any given situation, the identity
and efficiency of the exact mechanism is dependent upon the breadth of
the initial distribution of the information.1 3 1 Furthermore, the informa-
tion costs of providing such information will determine the breadth of
that initial distribution. 13 2 Regulation FD results in a decrease in informa-
tion costs and a concomitant increase in the breadth of the initial distribu-
tion, which will likely result in a more efficient capital market.
under Regulation FD, even though the materiality of the disclosure is unclear
.. .. .).
127. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF CORPORATION Fi-
NANCE: MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS (4th Supp.
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.
htm [hereinafter TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS] (stating Regulation FD does not
create duty or change existing law regarding duty to update).
128. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000) (requiring broad public disclo-
sure by issuers). Furthermore, any verification costs currently incurred by analysts
in certifying the veracity of information received from other analysts will dissipate
as analysts begin receiving such information directly from issuers. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 98, at 594-95 (stating principal verification cost of subse-
quent recipient is determining originator's truthfulness).
129. See id. (describing individual verification costs). Individual investors who
previously received information from third parties, such as other investors, will no
longer have to expend considerable resources assessing the veracity of that third
party because the originator of the information will be the issuer, who remains
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See generally 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000) (setting forth general prohibition upon manipulative
and deceptive devices).
130. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 568-87 (describing different
mechanisms).
131. See id. at 592 (stating breadth of initial distribution determines relative
"efficiency of market's response.").
132. See id. ("Understanding market efficiency... requires detailed analysis of
the nature and dynamics of information costs.").
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2. Regulation FD and Market Efficiency in a "Noisy" Capital Marketplace
Although the ECMH has served, and continues to serve, as a useful
structure within which the market valuation of securities can be conceptu-
alized, many scholars challenge whether the ECMH fully accounts for the
values attributed by the market.' 3 3 These scholars believe that "noise"13 4
has a substantial impact upon trading behavior; an impact the ECMH trivi-
alizes. 135 To demonstrate the significant impact of noise, as well to expose
the ECMH's trivialization of noise as unacceptable, noise theorists draw
heavily upon research in the field of psychology, namely behavioral psy-
chology. 13 6 Such research has shown that individuals often act in seem-
ingly irrational and unpredictable ways, including the manner in which
decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, and the tendency to
base decisions upon vivid and easily recalled information. 137 Individuals
may also become overconfident in personal predictive abilities, value se-
133. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 858-65 (surveying empirical research).
134. Id. at 854. "Noise" is defined as "pricing influences not associated with
rational expectations about asset values." Id.
135. See generally Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, J. EcoN. PERSPS. 19 (1990) ("If the efficient markets hypothesis
was a publicly traded security, its price would be enormously volatile .... ).
The ECMH states that irrational, or "noise," trading is counteracted two ways.
First, the ECMH posits that noise trading that is based upon individual biases or
mistakes will not effect the price-setting process because such trades will be can-
celed out by other noise trades, resulting in a market equilibrium that reflects the
securities actual price. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 581 (increase in
number of trades leads to "washing out" of individual biases). Second, if a secur-
ity's price does move away from its actual value due to irrational trades, the dis-
crepancy will be immediately capitalized upon by learned investors, thereby
stabilizing the security's price. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 863 (describing
explanation as the "economist's trump card."). But see Cox ET AL., supra note 97, at
42 (discussing risks involved in price decoding). Attempts to capitalize upon seem-
ingly erroneous prices entails two risks: (1) the potential arbitrageur's prediction
of appropriate value may be incorrect; and (2) a security whose price is currently
out of line may remain out of line. See id.
In his thoughtful article entitled, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, Donald Langevoort acknowledged these two ECMH re-
sponses are "well taken" and have possibly "served largely to immunize the
[ECMH] from behavioral revisionism but for two sorts of observations." Langevoort,
supra note 102 at 863 (emphasis added). First, Langevoort noted, there is evi-
dence that market fads exist and that many, including securities professionals, do
not believe in the ECMH. See id. Second, a substantial body of statistical data
appears to contradict the ECMH. See id. (citing Stephen F. Leroy, Efficient Capital
Markets and Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1583, 1595-1603 (1989) (summarizing
studies conducted through 1989)).
136. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 857 (acknowledging "palpable ten-
sion" between ECMH and behavioral research).
137. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System, 59
J. Bus. S385, S385 (1986) (finding that in situations of uncertainty and immediacy,
individual choices not wholly based upon rational reflection); see als0JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 416 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) (describing tendency of individual to discredit or ignore information incon-
sistent with individual's choice once made).
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curities owned over securities available to be purchased, and pursue strate-
gies based on the belief that securities are mispriced and engaged in
seasonal trends. 1
38
Furthermore, noise theorists believe that the ECMH fails not only to
take into account the fact that individual trading decisions are heavily in-
fluenced by trader interaction, but also that investors routinely underreact
and overreact to corporate announcements. 39Although the research con-
cerning noise trading in the capital markets does call into question a num-
ber of premises upon which the ECMH resides-thus leaving the exact
dynamics of market behavior unresolved-recognizing the beneficial ef-
fects of Regulation FD does not require a perfectly efficient market.1 40
For example, consider the following hypothetical situation. Sellnow,
Inc. ("Sellnow") is a publicly traded company whose shareholders consist
of both informed and uninformed investors. 1 4 1 Sellnow selectively dis-
closes to a handful of analysts that it has lost a supply contract currently
accounting for ten percent of Sellnow's revenues. The analysts then ad-
vise each of the informed investors of the information; a number of in-
formed investors sell their holding's of Sellnow securities; and the price of
Sellnow drops. Next, the uninformed investors will "decode" the change
in price and assume Sellnow has received bad news. 142 Consequently, the
138. See Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 238-40 (1986) (describing experi-
ment measuring overconfidence and concluding that persons are much more
likely to be overconfident about difficult probability judgments than easy
probability judgments). Edwards and Winterfeldt identified an "endowment ef-
fect" that caused consumers to "weight out-of-pocket losses more heavily than fore-
gone gains of equal expected value." Id. at 239-40; see also Cox ET AL., supra note
97, at 41 ("[N] one of these observations is consistent with the view that stock prices
are determined solely, or even significantly, by investor reaction to financial funda-
mentals related to the underlying investment."). Whether or not the findings of
behavioral research can be extended beyond the confines of the laboratory has
been disputed. See, e.g., Robin M. Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and
Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYCH. BULL. 197, 213 (1981)
("U]udgment and choice depend crucially upon the context in which they occur
and the cognitive representation of that context.").
139. See Cox ET AL., supra note 97, at 41-42 (describing work of well respected
noise theorist, Robert Shiller (citing Baruch Lev & Meiring de Viliers, Stock Price
Crashes and lOb-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REv. 7,
12-22 (1994)).
140. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 871 ("The prominence of [psychologi-
cal research showing market noise] demonstrates that economists' understanding
of securities prices is still evolving and may take any number of diverse directions
.... A substantial agenda for future research includes a sizeable cognitive psychol-
ogy component. By no means is the efficient market theory dead ....").
141. For purposes of this example, informed investors are those investors who
have retained the services of a financial analyst following Sellnow, Inc. Further-
more, uninformed investors include all investors who have not retained a financial
analyst, deciding instead to base their investment decisions solely upon informa-
tion readily available in the financial media.
142. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 575 (describing logic of price
decoding as "simple"). Under Gilson and Kraakman's exposition of the mecha-
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uninformed investors will sell as well, thereby exacerbating the drop in
price. However, without knowing what has been selectively disclosed to
the informed investors, the uninformed investors may continue to sell
even when the current market price of the security is dramatically under
its actual value. 143 In fact, the stock is likely to continue to fall until ana-
lysts instruct other informed investors to start buying. 144
Consider the same hypothetical under the disclosure regime created
by Regulation FD. In order to make the proposed disclosure to the select
group of analysts, Sellnow would be required to publicly disclose that in-
formation simultaneously to the uninformed investors. 145 Consequently,
the uninformed investors will be able to evaluate the information an-
nounced instead of speculate as to its existence. 14 6 Presumably, any subse-
quent sale of Sellnow stock by the uninformed investors would be based
upon a rational consideration of the company's disclosure, and the secur-
ity's price would decrease to reflect those informed sales.
1 47
B. Promoting Fairness and Taking the Chill Out of Corporate Communications
The federal securities laws were enacted to promote not only an effi-
cient operation of the capital market, but also to ensure that the securities
markets are fair for all participants. 148 The Supreme Court has recog-
nism underlying the ECMH, the selective disclosure triggers the relatively ineffi-
cient "derivatively informed" trading mechanism. For a discussion of the
"derivatively informed" trading mechanism, see supra note 108.
143. Enter the concept of market noise. Although the ECMH would suggest
that the price of Sellnow stock would cease to decline once the bad news has been
incorporated, it fails to account for the psychological phenomenon that noise the-
orists observe when uninformed investors jump on the bandwagon. For a discus-
sion of the behavioral research addressing irrational trading behavior, see supra
notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
144. Arguably, the price will return to a level that accurately reflects its actual
value-the market thereby operating "efficiently." Regulation FD, however, ac-
complishes the same result more quickly and with less volatility.
145. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000).
146. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 572-79 (discussing "trade de-
coding" and "price decoding"). Furthermore, the informed investors are not
granted the opportunity to reap the benefits of the selectively disclosed informa-
tion by selling their holdings before the price of Sellnow stock begins to fall.
147. See Cox ET A.., supra note 97, at 33 (discussing semi-strong form of mar-
ket efficiency). Regulation FD does not, of course, eliminate all noise from the
marketplace. It is possible that uninformed traders will either fail to acquire the
information or overestimate the potential impact of the information upon the
company, thereby engaging in noise trading even under Regulation FD.
148. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591
(Dec. 28, 1999) ("In enacting the mandatory disclosure system of the Exchange
Act, Congress sought to promote disclosure of 'honest, complete, and correct in-
formation' to facilitate the operation of fair and efficient markets." (quoting S.
REP. No. 73-1455, at68 (1934))); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) ("The
idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a
situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price ....").
But see Brountas, supra note 1, at 1548 ("Congress's purpose in passing the '34 Act
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nized that a necessary, beneficial effect of providing honest securities mar-
kets is to promote investor confidence in the market.1 49 Regulation FD
constitutes the Commission's attempt to maintain and increase investor
confidence by eliminating a common practice which it believes under-
mines the market's integrity. 150 Furthermore, Regulation FD curtails the
issuers' use of material nonpublic information as a commodity to ensure
favorable analyst coverage, thus allowing analysts to express their honest
opinions without fear of retribution. 15 1 Finally, Regulation FD may have
was not to ensure that stock prices accurately reflect stocks' true values." (citing
Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Mar-
ket Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 613, 699 (1988))).
149. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("[I]nvestors
likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law."); see also Opening
Statement of Chairman Arthur Levitt at the Open Meeting on Regulation Fair
Disclosure (News Supp., Aug. 10, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/
seldisal.htm [hereinafter Arthur Levitt] (stating importance of informed capital
markets). Chairmen Levitt stated:
High quality and timely information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant
markets. It is the very core of investor confidence .... If investors see a
stock's price change dramatically-but are given access to critical market-
moving information only much later-we risk nothing less that the pub-
lic's faith and confidence in America's capital markets.
Arthur Levitt, supra.
150. See Arthur Levitt, supra note 149 ("Regulation FD would bring all inves-
tors, regardless of the size of their holdings, into the information loop-where
they belong. To all of America's investors, it's well past time to say, 'Welcome to
the neighborhood."'). Not surprisingly, Proposed Regulation FD received over-
whelmingly positive reviews from individual investors. See Fact Sheet: Regulation
FairDisclosure and New Insider Trading Rules (Aug. 10, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/extra/sdiscfaq.htm ("The Proposing Release prompted . . . nearly 6,000
comment letters. The vast majority of the comments were from individual inves-
tors who urged ... that the Commission adopt Regulation FD."); see also Commis-
sioner Laura S. Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age: Can There Be Too
Much of a Good Thing? (June 26, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch387.htm [hereinafter Rethinking Disclosure] ("It is unusual for us to hear so
much about our proposals from individual investors.").
For a listing of recent reports of selectively disclosed material, see supra note
9; see also E-mail from Gary Aguirre, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (May 24, 2000, 10:27 EST), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73199/aguirre1.txt (individual investor incurring substantial losses in
context of selective disclosure); E-mail from Doug Wilmsmeyer, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000), (available at
www.sec.gov (claiming current system "discriminatory").
151. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,731
(Aug. 24, 2000) ("Analysts will continue to be able to use and benefit from supe-
rior diligence or acumen, without facing the prospect that other analysts will have
a competitive edge solely because they say more favorable things about issuers.").
The use of inside information as a commodity is a concern that the Commis-
sion has repeatedly expressed. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, supra note 149 ("[A]s Wall
Street analysts play an increasingly visible role ... some corporate management
treat material information as a commodity."); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592 ("In this environment, analysts are likely to feel
pressured to report favorably .... ); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,717 ("[A] nalysts who publish negative views of an issuer are some-
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other beneficial effects, which include increased liquidity, low stock price
volatility and decreased cost of capital.' 52
The most common complaint received from issuers and securities
professionals in response to the Proposed Regulation FD is that the rule
would have a "chilling" effect upon corporate communications. 15 3 In
turn, the SEC has identified five aspects of Final Regulation FD which it
believes addresses the concern. 154 First, Regulation FD has been nar-
rowed to include only communications between issuers and enumerated
securities professionals, and securities holders under circumstances in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that the security holder will trade upon
the disclosed information. 155 The regulation no longer applies to all com-
munications to persons outside the issuer, and excludes communications
made to any person who expressly agrees to keep the disclosed informa-
times excluded by that issuer [from future selective disclosures]."); see also Amitabh
Dugar & Siva Nathan, Analysts'Research Reports: Caveat Emptor, 5J. INVESTING 13, 14
(1996) ("Retribution ranges from refusing the analyst's calls for information, to
barring the analyst from mailings, conference calls, and meetings, and even threats
of legal action and physical harm." (citations and footnote omitted)). But see E-
mail from Lee Spencer, The Ad Hoc Working Group on Proposed Regulation FD
and George A. Schieren, Vice President-Legal, SIA Compliance and Legal Division,
Securities Industry Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Apr. 6, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73199/spencer1.htm ("Leveling the playing field for analysts, as among them-
selves and vis-a-vis the general public, will undermine the great advantages of the
current system.").
152. See NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATIONS INSTITUTE, STANDARDS OF PRACICE
FOR INVESTOR RELATIONS 7 (1st ed. Apr. 1998) (concluding liberal policies lead to
increased analyst following, narrower consensus in earnings estimates, decreased
price volatility and ultimately a lower cost of capital (citing Russell Lundholm &
Mark Lang, The Benefits of More Forthcoming Disclosure Practices (Univ. of
Mich. Sch. of Bus. Admin. 1994))); M.J. Fishman & K.M. Hagerty, Insider Trading
and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RANDJ. OF ECON. 106, 106 (1992) (finding that
insider trading leads to decreased liquidity, increased volatility and increased cost
of capital).
153. See Rethinking Disclosure, supra note 150 ("These commenters assert that
determining materiality is too difficult and risky, making corporate officials less
inclined to discuss important information at all.").
Interestingly, the Commission also received complaints that adoption of Regu-
lation FD would create too much disclosure, resulting in investor confusion. See id.
(describing complaints as "ironic"). However, Regulation FD is consistent with the
current trend of Internet-savvy investors demanding access to information, refus-
ing to rely exclusively upon professional research. See Selective Disclosure and In-
sider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717 ("[The] online revolution has created a
greater demand, expectation, and need for direct delivery of market
information.").
154. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,736 (list-
ing modifications to Proposed Regulation FD).
155. Compare Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594
(including communications to anyone outside the issuer), with 17 C.F.R.
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tion confidential. 156 Second, Regulation FD applies only to communica-
tions made by senior officials of the issuer and individuals who are in
regular contact with securities professionals. 157 Third, the revised Regula-
tion FD includes an express provision that eliminates any concern over
private lOb-5 liability arising out of rule violations. 158 Fourth, regarding
materiality judgments, Regulations FD's "knowing or reckless" conduct
standard precludes the Commission from bringing enforcement actions
for mistaken materiality judgments that the Commissions cannot establish
were either intentional or reckless. 159 Finally, a violation of Regulation FD
will not affect an issuer's eligibility to use short form registration or resell
securities under Rule 144.160
Those analysts that are dissatisfied with Regulation FD can be given
three further assurances. First, Regulation FD is targeted at issuers-plac-
ing the responsibility of avoiding, and the risk of engaging in, selective
disclosure on the issuer. 161 Analysts can, however, in egregious situations,
be found in violation of Regulation FD. 162 Second, as Regulation FD es-
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b) (2); TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note
127, at Question 10-11 (noting that confidentiality agreement must be express,
however no additional agreement not to trade is necessary).
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (2000) (defining "issuer" and "person acting on
behalf of an issuer"). Furthermore, Regulation FD does not apply to communica-
tions made by a senior official of an issuer if the issuer has a policy expressly limit-
ing who is authorized to speak and the insider making the communication is not
authorized. See TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 127 (stating that such
communications "are made in breach of a duty of trust and confidence ... and are
not covered by Regulation FD").
158. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.102.
159. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (noting an "intentional" disclosure occurs
"when the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not know-
ing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and nonpub-
lic"); see also TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 127, at Question 7 (restating
that "seemingly inconsequential data" does not become material simply because
skilled analyst is able to reveal material nonpublic information by combining such
data with public information and analyst's knowledge of issuer and its industry);
Remarks of Richard H. Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, Regulation
FD-An Enforcement Perspective (Nov. 1, 2000,) at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch415.htm [hereinafter Enforcement Perspective E-mail] ("An issuer's
incorrect determination that information is not material must represent an 'ex-
treme departure' from standards of reasonable care ... .
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.103 (2000).
161. See Enforcement Perspective E-mail, supra note 159 ("Regulation FD, first
and foremost, is designed and intended to address issuer conduct.").
162. In a recent speech, the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement
discussed a number of situations in which analysts may face liability. See Enforce-
ment Perspective E-mail, supra note 159. For instance, analyst liability would attach
if an analyst and an issuer conspire to exchange material nonpublic information.
See id. (describing "suspect" behavior). Similarly, the Director admonished the use
of abusive and threatening conduct by the analyst to procure such information
and restated that judicial rules regarding insider trading remain applicable to is-
suer-analyst relationships. See id. ("It is okay to be persistent and dogged; it is not
okay to be abusive and threatening."). Finally, the Director reminded analysts that
inducing violations of Regulation FD will have a substantially negative impact upon
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tablishes a new market norm for issuer-analysts communications, the mar-
ket will likely reward issuers with more liberal disclosure practices. 163
Finally, and most importantly, early indications show an increase in issuer
disclosures since Regulation FD's adoption. 164
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC has adopted Regulation FD in response to what it views as a
problematic practice of issuers selectively disclosing material nonpublic in-
formation to privileged members of the investment community.165 Regu-
lation FD effectively outlaws selective disclosure under its two-part scheme
of broad concurrent disclosure for intentional communications and
prompt dissemination following non-intentional disclosures. 166 Although
Regulation FD seemingly eliminates analysts' incentives in ferreting out
information, it may in practice result in increased market efficiency and
increased disclosure, while furthering the purposes behind the federal se-
curities laws. 167.
Anthony T. Horgan
the business relationship between the issuer and analyst. See id. ("It is unlikely that
an issuer led into a violation by an analyst will speak freely to that analyst again.").
163. For a discussion of the market's response to issuer disclosure practices,
see supra note 152.
164. See Barbara C. Costanza, Fair Disclosure Gets Companies to Talk (Dec. 17,
2000), available at CBS.MarketWatch.com (stating that 700 companies have made
public statements regarding earnings; 321 were warnings (compared to 439 com-
panies and 204 warnings at this time last year)). Note, however, that the apparent
increase in disclosures could simply constitute issuers publicizing information they
would have otherwise selectively disclosed to analysts.
165. For a discussion of the issue presented by selective disclosure and judi-
cial background prior to Regulation FD, see supra notes 13-56 and accompanying
text.
166. For a discussion of the disclosure scheme created by Regulation FD, see
supra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of Regulation FD's impact upon market efficiency and
fairness, see supra notes 96-164 and accompanying text.
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